Constantinos
N. Tsiantis
ARISTOTLE’S
FOUR CAUSES AND THEIR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE: THE DEBATE
ON CAUSALITY
Key
words: Causes,
Aristotle, Bacon, Education, Democracy
Abstract
1. The importance of philosophy in the
midst of a generalized crisis lies in its ability to seek explanation
and find the causes shaping the painful course of human condition.
The paper underlines that Plato and
Aristotle saw politics as central part of their philosophical
inquiry with purpose to serve the well being of man and his/ her
eudaimonia. Thus Aristotle, by seeking the causes/ aitia
of physical changes: the truth for "what can not be otherwise"
(realm of necessity), he was developing also the logical scheme for
understanding "what it was to be otherwise’’ (realm of
freedom): the realm of poiesis and techne that
characterizes polis: the topos of man as social,
creative and political being. Politics is for Aristotle the leading
architectural art (Ethics, 1094a30-31) which controls economy and
what he calls chrimatistiki and kapilikon (Politics,
1257b1-5).
Through induction and reasoning
Aristotle developed the Organon of scientific search which
demands answers to four basic questions-causes (Analytica,
94a20-23): the material cause, the formal cause, the
efficient cause, and the final cause-telos (Physics
II 3). All four of these questions must be asked in regard to any
inquiry and work of art (ergon), since this is the way to
knowledge and good life (Analytica, 71b9–11).
2. Until the beginning of the 12th
century, the Aristotelian causes were an integral part of the
philosophical tradition and the realm of science was distinguished
into Theoretical - composed of Physics, Mathematics and Theology
(Metaphysics), and into Practical, composed of Ethics, Economy,
Politics and logic. That distinction changed during the period of
new technical inventions and discovery of new continents, of the emergence of stock market and banks and especially of experimental
science which marked the Renaissance and Reformation in Europe
(15th-17th century). The Aristotelian method received the sharp
criticism of nominalism (Ockham) and later the four causes were
divided by the Neo Organon that F. Bacon developed for the
reconstruction of science. As result: the material cause and
the efficient cause, by losing their direct bond with form
and telos, were used for Physics-Mechanics, while the formal
cause and the final cause, for Metaphysics-Mathematics.
Politics and Economy lost thus their place in the corpus of science.
3. The paper refers also to the consequences
of above changes in later philosophy and socio-political life, by noticing in particular the absence of Politics and Economy from
the curriculum of general studies. Thinking on the consequences
the author claims (Poetics, 1450b10-12) that: whenever a gap emerges
either in philosophy either in legislation and politics, life covers
it by the informal action or the economic initiative of risqué
individuals or groups who are working for their own purpose or benefit. The
negative impact of such an arbitrary social action is fostering
individualism, the distortion and darkening of Logos, the gradual
control of political processes and finally the prevalence of Economy
(economic elites) over Politics.
In conclusion: It is necessary as
society and thinkers to restore and renew our bond with the
Aristotelian causes and make scientific and philosophical truth the
guide for regaining democracy.
Constantinos
N. Tsiantis
ARISTOTLE’S
FOUR CAUSES AND THEIR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE: THE DEBATE
ON CAUSALITY
1.
The need for causality
1.1.
We live in an age of unprecedented scientific and technological
advances accompanied, however, by an equally unprecedented moral
obsolescence of man and stubbornly unsolved problems in human
societies throughout the globe: poverty, misery, wars, unemployment,
terrorism, violence, fanaticism, intolerance, crowds of homeless and
refugees, destruction of the ecosystem, marginalization of the weak
and living conditions insulting human dignity and giving history
the character of chaos and absurdity. And the question is: Why all
this? Isn’t man a rational being? Why he doesn't enjoy life? Why
he doesn't honor the great gift that nature, in this remote corner
of the universe, brought, put under its shield and gave him? What is
it of us that destroys us;
1.2.
Early Greek philosophy and science opened for man the road of
rationality, permitting him to move from Myth to Logos:
from the kingdom of Olympian gods, who held his destiny, to demos:
to the Assembly of citizens who through free debate (illuminating
dialogue) decided on the common issues of polis
(city-state). Democracy: the dominion of demos
was first established (594 B.C) by Solon (a man of prudence and
practical wisdom), as a solution to the intense social conflict
between rich and poor which had broken in the economic and productive
life of Athens. The trust of social opponents to Logos
(to the justice of reason), became the basis of Democracy, which
flourished later in the era of Cleisthenes, Efialtis and Pericles
marking the ‘’gold age’’ of Athens.
1.3 The achievement of Democracy
fostered the course of Greek philosophy and science and enriched
rational thinking with the point of view concerning the causes of
things. Democracy was a basic cause for a turning of philosophy from
the issues of nature to those of polis (the realm of man) and also
for the development of ‘’cause-effect’’ reasoning which
characterizes Aristotle's epistemology. But in the development of
Aristotle’s philosophy, besides the social life, all the previous
course of philosophy, science and art was studied and critically
scrutinized in order to be ensured a safe basis for truth.
2. The PreAristotelian roots of
causality [in the final version of the text]
3.
The
Aristotelian method of the four causes.
3.1.
Through
induction (ἐπαγωγὴ) and reasoning (συλλογισμός,
syllogism) Aristotle developed his epistemological method titled
Organon.
Induction starts from the sensible and concrete things and moves
towards the universal and abstract; it is ‘’the starting-point
which knowledge even of the universal presupposes, while syllogism
proceeds from universals’’. However, there are starting-points
which are not reached by syllogism and are acquired by induction
(Nic.Eth.,1139b30-40).
The
Aristotelian method defines a set of questions for the explanation
of change both in nature and human societyi.
Its subject is both the realm of necessity, where things might not
have otherwise [ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὃ ἐπιστάμεθα,
μηδ' ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν]
(Nic.Eth.,1139b24-25), and the realm of choice: where things might
have otherwise [τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως
ἔχειν] (Nic.Eth.,1140a1-2). The first realm is the domain of
science [ἐπιστήμη]; the second realm is the domain of
poiesis
(making)
and praxis
(acting) [ποιητὸν καὶ πρακτόν]
(Nic.Eth.,1040a1-2). Concerning the foundation of Organon
significant notions are found in Aristotle’s Physics,
Metaphysics
and
Nicomachean
Ethics.
3.2.Potentiality
and Actuality
The
basis of Aristotle’s method is his perception of Being both as
potentiality and as actuality. For a change to occur, the potential
for change must be. Everything changes from potential being into
active being (ἐπεὶ δὲ διττὸν τὸ ὄν, μεταβάλλει
πᾶν ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος εἰς τὸ
ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν) (Met., 1069b16-17). Aristotle derived this
maxim by using Democritus’ principle that: "all things were
together potentially but not actually'' and by relating it to the
‘One’ of Anaxagoras and the ‘Mixture’ of Empedocles and
Anaximander (Met.,1069b17-26). According to this sense of Being ‘’not
only can a thing come to be, incidentally, out of that which is not,
but also all things come to be out of that which is, but is
potentially, and is not actually’’ (Met.1069b9-22) .
3.3.
Coming into being: concept and principle of change
3.3.1.
Searching upon the notion of change Aristotle asks first for the
principle of change. Thus he arrives to the position that ‘‘things
come into being either by art or by nature or by luck or by
spontaneity’’ [ἢ γὰρ τέχνῃ ἢ φύσει γίγνεται
ἢ τύχῃ ἢ τῷ αὐτομάτῳ] (Met.1070a7-8). On this
base he can make the distinction between nature and art. As he
states: ‘’Art is a principle of movement in something other than
the thing moved (in art the ‘‘origin is in the creator and not in
the thing made'' ), nature is a principle in the thing itself (for
man begets man), and the other causes [luck and spontaneity] are
privations of these two’’ [ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἀρχὴ
ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ
（ἄνθρωπος
γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ
αἰτίαι στερήσεις τούτων] (Met.,1070a6-11).
3.3.2.
Before to arrive to his position for the principle of change,
Aristotle determines the notions of (a) opposites and philosophy, (b)
substratum, (c) matter, (d) substance and essence.
(a).
Aristotle’s Metaphysics starts with the generally hold principle
of contraries, in the large list of which ‘’one of the two
columns is privative (στέρησις)’’, not in the simple
sense of negation (the absence of the thing in question), but in the
sense that ‘’in privation there is also employed an underlying
nature of which the privation is asserted’ (Met.,1004b30). As he
states: ‘’At least all name contraries as their first
principles-some name odd and even, some hot and cold, some limit and
the unlimited, some love and strife. And all the others as well are
evidently reducible to unity and plurality (this reduction we must
take for granted), and the principles stated by other thinkers fall
entirely under these as their genera’’ [ἔτι τῶν ἐναντίων
ἡ ἑτέρα συστοιχία στέρησις, καὶ πάντα
ἀνάγεται εἰς τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, καὶ
εἰς ἓν καὶ πλῆθος, οἷον στάσις τοῦ
ἑνὸς κίνησις δὲ τοῦ πλήθους] (Met.,1004b).
Adopting
what ‘’nearly all thinkers agree’’ (Met.1004b30), he holds
that: ‘’All things are either contraries or composed of
contraries, and unity and plurality are the starting-points of all
contraries [πάντα γὰρ ἢ ἐναντία ἢ ἐξ
ἐναντίων, ἀρχαὶ δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων τὸ
ἓν καὶ πλῆθος] (Met.1005a3). He stresses also that the
search of contrariety (ἐναντιότης) does not belong to
sophistry, dialectics or to some particular sciences but to one
science (philosophy) that is examining being qua being [φανερὸν
οὖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι μιᾶς ἐπιστήμης
τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν θεωρῆσαι] (Met.1005a3). In it are
examined also ‘’the attributes which belong to it qua being- not
only substances but also their attributes, both those above named and
the concepts 'prior' and 'posterior', 'genus' and 'species', 'whole'
and 'part', and the others of this sort’’ (Met.1005a15).
(b)
Aristotle proceeds now to the question about the substratum
(το ὑποκείμενον)
of change. He defines it with the words: ‘’The substratum is
that of which everything else is predicated, while it is itself not
predicated of anything else’’
[ἔστι γάρ τι καθ᾽ οὗ κατηγορεῖται
τούτων ἕκαστον, ᾧ τὸ εἶναι ἕτερον καὶ
τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἑκάστῃ （τὰ
μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα τῆς οὐσίας κατηγορεῖται,
αὕτη δὲ τῆς ὕλης）]
(Μετ.1028b43-45,1029a9-10).
His definition goes deeply into the root of things, as he states
that: ‘’The ultimate substratum is of itself neither a particular
thing nor of a particular quantity nor otherwise positively
characterized; nor yet is it the negations of these, for negations
also will belong to it only by accident’’ [ὥστε τὸ
ἔσχατον καθ᾽ αὑτὸ οὔτε τὶ οὔτε ποσὸν
οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν ἐστιν: οὐδὲ δὴ αἱ
ἀποφάσεις, καὶ γὰρ αὗται ὑπάρξουσι
κατὰ συμβεβηκός] (Met,1029a28). How such a
substratum is named?
(c)
Aristotle names it ‘’matter’’ (ὕλη) and perceives it as
follows: "Sensible substance (αἰσθητὴ οὐσία) is
changeable. Now if change proceeds from opposites or from
intermediates (ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἢ τῶν
μεταξύ), and not from all opposites (for the voice is
not-white, (but it does not therefore change to white)), but from the
contrary (ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου), there must be something
underlying which changes into the contrary state (ἀνάγκη
ὑπεῖναί τι τὸ μεταβάλλον εἰς τὴν
ἐναντίωσιν);
for the contraries do not change (οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία
μεταβάλλει). Further, something persists (ὑπομένει)
, but the contrary does not persist; there is, then, some third thing
besides the contraries, viz. the matter (ἔστιν ἄρα τι
τρίτον παρὰ τὰ ἐναντία, ἡ ὕλη) [1069β].
This matter, then, must be capable of both states: the potential (ἐν
δυνάμει)
and the active (ἐνεργείᾳ) (Meta,1069b)ii.
By being such, it is the last subject of change and
the
factor of continuity (Met.,1014a30):
prime matter (ἐσχάτη ὕλη). ‘’The prime matter and the
form are one and the same thing, the one potentially, and the other
actually’’ [ἡ ἐσχάτη ὕλη καὶ ἡ μορφὴ
ταὐτὸ καὶ ἕν, δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ,
ὥστε ὅμοιον τὸ ζητεῖν τοῦ ]
(Met.1045b18-20). This notion of matter, being
in line with the outcomes of contemporary science, has gained the
high interest of contemporary epistemologyiii.
Aristotle
completes his notion of matter with the notion of ‘’noetic
mater’’ (νοητή
ὕλη),
which been neglected by new epistemology.
As he states: ‘’Matter is unknowable in itself. And some matter
is sensible (αἰσθητή)
and some noetic (νοητή),
sensible matter being for
instance bronze and wood and all matter that is changeable, and
noetic matter being that which is present in sensible things not qua
sensible, i.e. the objects of mathematics’’
[ἡ δ᾽ ὕλη ἄγνωστος καθ᾽ αὑτήν. ὕλη
δὲ ἡ μὲν αἰσθητή ἐστιν ἡ δὲ νοητή,
αἰσθητὴ μὲν οἷον χαλκὸς καὶ ξύλον
καὶ ὅση κινητὴ ὕλη, νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἐν
τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπάρχουσα μὴ ᾗ αἰσθητά,
οἷον τὰ μαθηματικά] (Met.1036a10-14).
(d)
By using the notions of universal (τὸ καθόλου) and genus
(τὸ γένος), Aristotle arrives at the particular individual
thing, the essence of which identifies with the ‘’what it was to
be’’ (τί ἦν εἶναι); this is it substance (οὐσία)
(Met.,1031a22). He writes: "The word 'substance' (οὐσία)
is applied, if not in more senses, still at least to four main
objects: for both the essence (τί ἦν εἶναι) and the
universal (τὸ καθόλου) and the genus (τὸ γένος),
are thought to be the substance of each thing (οὐσία δοκεῖ
εἶναι ἑκάστου), and fourthly the substratum (τὸ
ὑποκείμενον)’’iv
(Met.,1028b40-45). Thus: there is a matter proper to it each thing
(Met.1044.17-22) and ‘’there is knowledge of each thing only when
we know its essence; the same holds for other things as for the
good’’ [ἐπιστήμη τε γὰρ ἑκάστου ἔστιν
ὅταν τὸ τί ἦν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι γνῶμεν,
καὶ ἐπὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως
ἔχει] (Met.1031b7).
3.3.3.
Through this mode of reasoning Aristotle concludes: (1) That ‘’the
cause for what occurs starts from the deprivation and the subject,
which we call matter’’ (αἲτιον δ’ ὃτι γίγνεται
ἐκ της στερήσεως και τοῦ ὑποκειμένου,
ὃ λέγομεν ὓλην, 1033α9-11), (2) ‘’Everything that
changes is something and is changed by something and into something.
That by which it is changed is the immediate mover; that which is
changed, the matter; that into which it is changed, the morphy
(form)’’ (Met.1069b39-49,1070a1-5), and (3) Every art (τέχνη)
and every inquiry (μέθοδος), and similarly every praxis
(πρᾶξις)
and choice (προαίρεσις), is thought to aim at some good
(ἀγαθόν); the good (τἀγαθὸν) and the best (τὸ
ἄριστον) is the purpose at which all things aimv
(Nic. Eth, 1094a). But purpose
cannot exist without thought’’vi.
3.4.
The four causes
3.4.1.
The four causes define for Aristotle the method of knowing and
explaining change in nature but also the method of explaining change
and acting in society. There
are four causes concerning a thing: (1) the morphological
/formal cause
(τὸ
τί ἦν εἶναι) ,
(2) the material
cause (τὸ
τίνων ὄντων ἀνάγκη τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι)
or ‘’that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists,
e.g. the bronze of the statue, the silver of the bowl, and the genera
of which the bronze and the silver are species’’, (3) the
kinetic/
efficient cause
(τί
πρῶτον ἐκίνησε),
and (4) the final
cause
(τὸ οὖ
ἕνεκα)’’
(PostAnal.2.ii
and Physics,
2.ii).
In Metaphysics
these causes are described as follows: "Causes are spoken of in
four senses. In one of these we mean the substance and the essence
(τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) (for the
'why' is reducible finally to the definition, and the ultimate 'why'
is a cause and principle); in another the matter (ὕλην) and
substratum (ὑποκείμενον), in a third the source of the
change (ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως), and in a
fourth the cause opposed to this, the purpose (τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα)
and the good (τἀγαθόν) (for this is the end of all generation
and change)’’ (Met.983a29-35).
3.4.2.
All poiesis/making
is coming, according to Aristotle, either from art, or power or
intellect (Metaphysics,
1032a30-33). Art ‘’is a state concerned with making, involving a
true course of reasoning, and lack of art on the contrary is a state
concerned with making, involving a false course of reasoning; both
are concerned with the variable. Architecture is an art and is
essentially a reasoned state of capacity to makevii.
3.4.3.
Poiesis
(making) and praxis
(acting)
differ: ‘‘Both things made and things done are included in the
variable, but they differ. The reasoned state of capacity to act is
different from the reasoned state of capacity to make. Hence too they
are not included one in the other; for neither is acting making nor
is making acting’’. In addition: ‘’The origin of praxis
is choice (πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις):
choice is the origin of movement of praxis
(its efficient cause) but not its end (its οὗ ἕνεκα). The
origin of
choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end
(ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος). This
is why choice does not exist without reason and intellect (ἄνευ
νοῦ καὶ διανοίας) and without a moral state (οὔτ᾽
ἄνευ ἠθικῆς ἐστὶν ἕξεως); for good praxis
(εὐπραξία) and its opposite cannot exist without a
combination of intellect and character (ἄνευ διανοίας
καὶ ἤθους)’’ (Ηθ.Νικ,1139α35-40).
3.3.4.
Aristotle insists on the difference between praxis
(acting) and poiesis
(making)
and focuses on their difference in relation to ends: the end of
praxis
is reached with the completion of its activity, while the end of
poiesis
goes
beyond the completion of its activity (telos,
end): beyond the product (ergon).
This difference is made clear in Nicomachean
Ethics where
Aristotle states that: ‘’Intellect itself, however, moves
nothing, but only the intellect which aims at an end and is practical
(πρακτική); for this rules the productive intellect, as well
(αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει);
to create is the cause of any creator (ἕνεκα γάρ του
ποιεῖ πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν), and that which is made [ergon]
is not simply an end (οὐ τέλος ἁπλῶς) but (also) a why
(πρός
τι)
and for whose sake the work
(καὶ
τινος
τὸ ποιητόν)’’
(Nic.Eth., 1139b1-4). The above lines of Aristotle’s text (‘’ἕνεκα
γάρ του ποιεῖ πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν, καὶ οὐ
τέλος ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρός τι καὶ τινος
τὸ ποιητόν’’), however, we consider that have been
misused in their transfer to the West (a parenthesis was inserted
which distorted its meaning, viz.Ross) (Nic.Eth.,1140b6-8).
3.4.6.
Politics and rationality
The
realization of good belongs to the task of the most dominant and
architectural science, of politics. According to Aristotle:
‘’Politics is
most truly the master art; for it is this that ordains which of the
sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of
citizens should learn and up to what point they should learn them;
and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under
this, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric.
Since
politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it
legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from,
the end of this science must include those of the others, so that
this end must be the good for man’’
(Nic.Eth., 1094b).
Politics
requires men who can
see what is good for themselves and what is good for men in general,
men of courage, prudence and practical wisdom. That’s why ‘’we
think Pericles and men like him have practical wisdom, viz. because
they can see what is good for themselves and what is good for men in
general’’ (Eth.Nic,1140b8-11).
4.
The separation of causes and the dispute of causality
Until
the beginning of the 12th century, the Aristotelian Organon
was
an integral part of the philosophical tradition and the realm of
science was distinguished into Theoretical and Practical: Ethics,
Economy, Politics and Logic were an integral part of Practical
science, while Physics, Mathematics and Theology (Metaphysics) of
Theoretical science.
The
above division changed during the period of new science and new
economy which marked the era of Renaissance and Reformation in Europe
(15th-17th century). During that period the Aristotelian method
received the sharp criticism of nominalismviii
(Ockham) and F. Bacon with his Neo
Organon
divided Aristotle’s causes into two separate regions: specifically,
the material
cause
and the efficient
cause
determined the area of Physics-Mechanics, while the formal
cause and
the final
cause the
area of Metaphysics-Mathematics. The Cartesian dualism (the sharp
division of body and soul) gave another hit to Aristotelian causality
by suggesting that the final cause is not necessary in the scientific
explanation of natureix.
At the same era Politics and Economy were excluded from the domains
of Science and the school curriculum, loosing thus their bond with
the education of citizen.
One
hundred years after Galileo, David Hume argued that the ‘’why’’
is not merely second to the ‘how’’, but is totally superfluous
as it is subsumed by the ‘’how’’. In his "Treatise of
Human Nature" he argued that
causation is a learnable habit of mind and what we call ‘’cause’’
and ‘’effect’’ (and infer the existence of the one from that
of the other) is just their constant conjunction in all past
instances (like between the sensation we call ‘’heat’’ and
the object we call ‘’flame’’)x.
This
non-causal epistemology found in the 20th
century the generous support of Bertrand Russell who influenced
decisively its status. Russell argued that ‘’all philosophers
imagine that causation is one of the fundamental axioms of science,
yet oddly enough, in advanced sciences, the word 'cause' never occurs
... The law of causality, I believe, is a relic of bygone age,
surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed
to do no harm ..."xi.
The above ideas shook up causation so thoroughly that it has not
recovered to this day.
5.
New Organ and representative democracy
5.1.
The division of the Aristotelian causes did not took into account its
social and political consequences. In addition, that division led
epistemology to be divided into two directionsxii:
the causal and the non-causal, the last of which emphasized the mere
relations among things: the notions of association, necessary
connection, contingency, mathematical relation, probability,
correlation and spurious correlation- namely "correlations that
do not imply causation" (D. Hume, B. Russell, K. Pearson, P.
Suppes, O. J. Simpson, etc.)xiii.
That division did not had an impact only on science but on society
as well such that the two lines of epistemology cannot be considered
as socially neutral. These imply a stand in front of the
‘’cause-effect’’ sign of social movement, a stand in front
of the liberalization of economic forces or the ‘’cost-benefit’’
analysis. As Marcuse has stated: ‘’What science is hiding under
the cover of neutrality is a form of sovereignty, of power
politics’’xiv.
5.2. Further,
the omission of purpose from nature (viz. ecosystem) was used for
the omission of causes shaping society, where the growing economic
elite (the association of multinationals, bankers, financiers and
stock markets) took gradually the control of political life. The
atmosphere of non-causality dominated over society, while at the
same moment the economic elite was using the most extreme routes of
causation for the accumulation of capital. The common ground of polis
and the participation of citizens in decision making was lost. The
citizens through a fake democracy were essentially excluded from
political life; they were separated in political parties given
beforehand by others and their role was limited to vote every four
years and shake the flag of their party.
In
this sense the new epistemology, despite its contributions in
scientific progress, it functioned as a hidden disorientation
mechanism in the political enslavement of society and the
legitimation of economic oligarchy.
6.
Causality and new society
6.1.
Marx worked to uncover the rational and causal basis of capitalism.
In his Capital
he proved that the capital accumulation is derived through the law
of surplus value and also described the spectrum of social, political and
ideological mechanisms used for the domination of capital over people and
nations. Marx’s economic analysis of capitalism is correct.
However, the same does not hold for his ideological analysis and the proposed solution of proletariat dictatorship [accompanied by the abolition of
private property, the persecution of dissidents and religion beliefs,
the abolition of national identities].
6.2.
The cause of social problem is the absence of Democracy. Is the
abolition of Politics and the abolition of the essence of man to make
history: to be a “political animal’’.
6.3.
History and Aristotle are didactic here. The paradigm of ancient
Athens shows that the solution of social conflict is found in
Democracy: the assembly of people. Democracy is not just a polity and
government system (the system of minimum disadvantages); it is the
only shield against corruption for the survival of Politics. And
Politics for Aristotle is the leading architectural art (Nic.Eth.,
1094a30-31) and as such it can master over economy and what he calls
chrimatistiki
and kapilikon
(Politics, 1257b1-5). Politics and Democracy, therefore, is the only
way for surviving freedom as well as for serving public good and man’s
eudaimonia
(well being).
6.4.
The need for Democracy is confirmed: i). by the corruption of ''representative democracy'' and the fall of proletariat
dictatorship (1989), ii). by the rivers of blood shed by people into two World Wars as well as by a number of social revolutions. iii). by the number
of presidents and politicians who were assassinated during the last
centuries in attempting to protect public interest and human
freedom. It is, finally, confirmed by the challenge of an economic
elite which, while being the 0.7% of the world population, it holds in
its hands the 45.2% of world wealth, when the 71% of the world
population owns just 3%!
Therefore,
either we shall undertake the fight for Democracy either we shall
sink into fascism.
7.
As conclusion
7.1.
The way to confront the problems of contemporary man is to transcend
the dominant impression about chaos, confusion, irrationality and infeasibility of solutions on world matters. This stand is covering the problems. Economy acts strictly causally and it is only through
causality that we can arrive to its political control.
7.2.
The return of Politics in public life is feasible and the idea of the ancient Athenian Democracy can be adjusted to the conditions and
circumstances of today.
7.3.
The Aristotelian scheme of four causes defines the political issue of
today society as follows: i). The material
cause,
is economy, which we need to reshape in order to serve our end. ii). The
kinetic
cause,
is the body of citizens (citizenry), which we have to inform and
energize. iii). The morphological
cause,
is the scheme of Democracy that we need today, in view of the paradigm of
Athenian Democracy, and iv).The final
cause,
is the attainment of common good and human eudaimonia.
7.4.
The basic condition for this project is to renew our spiritual and
epistemological equipment in order to see both the mechanical and the
moral causes making the problem. It is also our task to illuminate
things and enhance confidence in citizens in undertaking the
responsibility of their future.
It
is time today for the contemporary move from Myth
to Logos
and finding and taking again the path to Pnyx.
Sources.
i
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.2.ii.html
iii
Sfendoni-Menzou, Demetra. Aristotle
today (in
Greek). Thessaloniki: Ziti Publications, 2010, pp.96-107.
viii
Nominalism holds that
general or abstract terms (e.g., strength, humanity) and predicate
exist, while universals or abstract objects (that do not exist in
space and time) do not exist.
x
David Hume, On
Human Nature and the Understanding,
(Ed. by A. Flew), Collier Books- Macmillan, New York- London, 1962.
xi
Bertrand
Russell, On the Notion of Cause, Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society Vol. 13 (1912 - 1913), pp. 1-26, Published by: Wiley on
behalf of The Aristotelian Society Stable URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4543833.
xiv
Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, Boston: Beacon Books, 1968,
p.7. Tr in Greek, Papazisis Publ.. 1971.
END
OF PAPER.
CONSTANTINOS
TSIANTIS
